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I.  Introduction 
In ﾠNovember ﾠ2010, ﾠthe ﾠAmerican ﾠSociety ﾠof ﾠInternational ﾠLaw’s ﾠInternational ﾠEconomic ﾠ
Law Interest Group convened a broad cross-section of scholars, practitioners and students of 
international economic law.  The focus of this conference was International Economic Law in a 
Time of Change: Reassessing Legal Theory, Doctrine, Methodology and Policy Prescriptions.  
Surveying the field, we became aware of certain swings in attitudes – from skepticism to 
euphoria and back to skepticism again – toward the empirical work that of late has been seeping 
into the curriculum and research of legal academies.  But if we want to know how the world is 
changing – and how our legal rules shape and should respond to that change – empirical studies 
are simply unavoidable.  At the same time, the real benefit of empirical studies is always a 
function of how intelligently such studies are conceived and executed.  The empirical turn in 
international economic law is inevitable, but the meaning of that turn is not.  Thus, as this paper 
will discuss, to ensure that legal scholar and empirical researchers are maximizing their ability to 
understand and influence this time of change in international economic law, collaboration – not 
distrust – between these groups will be essential.  
                                                           
 This paper is adapted from the Keynote Address given by Professor Simmons on November 18, 2010 at the 
American Society of International Law International Economic Law Interest Group conference held at the 
University ﾠof ﾠMinnesota ﾠLaw ﾠSchool, ﾠ“International Economic Law in a Time of Change: Reassessing Legal 
Theory, Doctrine, Methodology and Policy Prescriptions.” ﾠ ﾠIn this paper, the authors have deliberately adopted a 
tone that lies somewhere between the strained formality of a law review article and the feigned nonchalance of an 
academic address.  
* Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs; Director, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 
Government Department, Harvard University. 
** J.D. candidate, May 2011, Harvard Law School; M.Sc. International Political Economy, London School of 
Economics & Political Science, 2007.   
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The relationship between empirical social scientists and lawyers and legal researchers 
often recalls that of Sherlock Holmes (the sage) and Dr. Watson (the know-it-all scientist).   
Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson were lovers of the outdoors, so come spring one year, it was 
hardly surprising that they should have decided to spend a weekend camping on the Sussex 
downs.  As night fell, they pitched their tent, put on nightshirts, nightcaps and bed socks, and 
after a soothing cup of cocoa, said a cordial goodnight and went to sleep.  A few hours later, 
Holmes ﾠnudged ﾠWatson, ﾠand ﾠsaid ﾠ“Watson, ﾠWatson, ﾠlook ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠstars!” 
“What, ﾠwhat?” ﾠsaid ﾠWatson, ﾠroused ﾠfrom ﾠa ﾠdeep ﾠslumber. ﾠ“Ah ﾠyes, ﾠHolmes, ﾠthe ﾠstars.” ﾠ 
“Well, ﾠsaid ﾠHolmes, ﾠ“what ﾠdo ﾠyou ﾠmake ﾠof ﾠthem?” 
Watson, by then awake, summoned his academic training in the scientific method and 
said: ﾠ ﾠ“Well, ﾠHolmes, ﾠjudging ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠposition ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠstars ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠmoon, ﾠI ﾠdeduce ﾠ
chronologically, that it is some three hours since we fell asleep; geographically, that the earth has 
rotated forty-five degrees during that time; astronomically, that the handle of the big dipper is 
still pointing to the north star; and finally, meteorologically, that we can expect a fine day 
tomorrow. ﾠ ﾠWill ﾠthat ﾠdo?” 
“You ﾠidiot,” ﾠsaid ﾠHolmes. ﾠ ﾠ“I ﾠmeant ﾠthat ﾠsomeone ﾠhas ﾠstolen ﾠour ﾠtent!” 
Like ﾠHolmes, ﾠwe ﾠwill ﾠfocus ﾠour ﾠattentions ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠbig ﾠpicture: ﾠWhere ﾠis ﾠthe ﾠ“tent”? ﾠ ﾠWhat ﾠis ﾠ
the role of international economic law in a changing world, and how can the work of empirical 
social scientists complement that of legal scholars in thinking about and responding to that 
change? 
II.  The Empirical Turn in International Economic Law 
We ﾠbegin ﾠby ﾠdefining ﾠwhat ﾠwe ﾠmean ﾠby ﾠ“empirical” ﾠresearch. ﾠ ﾠAt ﾠthe ﾠmost ﾠgeneral ﾠlevel, ﾠ
empirical research is anything that is not purely theoretical or purely doctrinal.  Selected   3 
anecdotes and isolated historical episodes are, in this sense, empirical.  But what we intend to 
focus on in this paper ﾠis ﾠsomething ﾠmore ﾠsystematic: ﾠby ﾠ“empirical,” ﾠwe ﾠmean ﾠa ﾠsystematic ﾠ
examination of observable phenomena from which the researcher explicitly seeks to draw 
broader conclusions about the way the world – or some part of it – works.  As we envision it 
here, empirical research is about trying to draw conclusions that to some degree are 
generalizable: conclusions that apply to more than one specific historical case.  This is the kind 
of empiricism lawyers should care about, because as scholars and practitioners their professional 
raison ﾠd’etre is to develop rules with broad applicability. 
The empirical turn in legal scholarship generally has been pretty well documented.
1 
Indeed, there is even a law school rankings based on institutional strength in empirical legal 
studies.
2  In the specific area of international economic law, however, the trend has been noted, 
but less thoroughly documented.  Nonetheless, empirical research in international economic law 
is on the rise.  A Westlaw search of the Journals and Law Reviews database shows that the 
number ﾠof ﾠarticles ﾠcontaining ﾠthe ﾠterm ﾠ“international ﾠeconomic ﾠlaw” ﾠand ﾠsome ﾠvariant ﾠof ﾠ
“empirical” ﾠor ﾠ“statistical ﾠsignificance” ﾠhas ﾠincreased ﾠalmost ﾠsix-fold since 1998.
3  Almost a 
third of that increase has been published in the past four years alone.
4  Moreover, one of the 
leading international economic law journals – the Journal of International Economic Law, which 
                                                           
1 See generally, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss, When do Facts Persuade? Some Thoughts on the Market for Empirical 
Legal Studies, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 17 (2008); Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal 
Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 Indiana L.J. 141 (2006); Theodore Eisenberg, Why do Empirical Legal 
Scholarship?, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 1741 (2004); David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and 
Empiricism, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 575 (1984).   
2 See Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 Indiana L.J. 
141 (2006).   
3 Using ﾠWestlaw’s ﾠJournals ﾠand ﾠLaw ﾠReviews ﾠ(JLR) ﾠDatabase, ﾠthe ﾠauthors ﾠconducted ﾠthe ﾠfollowing ﾠsearches ﾠand ﾠ
obtained the following results on January 5, 2011: ﾠ(1) ﾠdate(bef ﾠ1998) ﾠ& ﾠ“international ﾠeconomic ﾠlaw” ﾠ& ﾠ“statistic! ﾠ
signific!” ﾠor ﾠ“empiric!” ﾠ-- 149 ﾠ;; ﾠ(2) ﾠdate(1998) ﾠ& ﾠ“international ﾠeconomic ﾠlaw” ﾠ& ﾠ“statistic! ﾠsignific!” ﾠor ﾠ“empiric!” ﾠ
– 48 ﾠresults;; ﾠ(3) ﾠdate(aft ﾠ1998) ﾠ& ﾠ“international ﾠeconomic ﾠlaw” ﾠ& ﾠ“statistic! ﾠsignific!” ﾠor ﾠ“empiric!” ﾠ– 826 results.  
(826 + 48) / 149 = 5.865. 
4 A ﾠsearch ﾠof ﾠ(date(aft ﾠ2005) ﾠ& ﾠ“international ﾠeconomic ﾠlaw” ﾠ& ﾠ“statistic! ﾠsignific!” ﾠor ﾠ“empiric!”) ﾠreturned ﾠ402 ﾠ
results.  1023 (the total number of results over all years) / 402 =  2.54.   4 
first went to press in 1998 – is peer-reviewed,
5 something ﾠconsidered ﾠ“quirky” ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠfield ﾠof ﾠ
law.
6 Its emphasis ﾠis ﾠon ﾠstudying ﾠ“fundamental, ﾠlong-term, systemic problems and [offering] 
possible ﾠsolutions, ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠlight ﾠof ﾠempirical ﾠobservations ﾠand ﾠexperience[,]” ﾠand ﾠit ﾠappears ﾠwell ﾠ
able to do so: of the 56 members
7 of the editorial board of the Journal of International Economic 
Law ﾠ(which ﾠreads ﾠlike ﾠa ﾠwho’s ﾠwho ﾠof ﾠIEL ﾠscholars, ﾠmany ﾠof ﾠwhom ﾠare ﾠhere ﾠtonight), ﾠ30 ﾠhave ﾠ
Ph.D.s or S.J.D.s, and thus are likely to have some training in quantitative methods.
 8 And of the 
82 or so speakers and moderators at this weekend’s ﾠconference, ﾠ32 ﾠ(or ﾠ39%) ﾠhave ﾠPh.D.s ﾠor ﾠ
S.J.D.s.
9  
It would be easy, of course, to overstate the significance of these figures.  For example, at 
the ASIL IELG Conference at Bretton Woods in November 2006, on the state and future of the 
international economic law discipline, 43% (17 of 39) of the speakers and moderators had Ph.D.s 
or S.J.D.s – more, percentage-wise, than at the present conference.
10  Moreover, there is a 
striking contrast between the composition of the JIEL Editorial Board and this conference – 
whereas there are a good number of Economics Ph.D.s. on the former, there are few here this 
weekend.  But it is no stretch to conclude that on top of the wealth of legal knowledge in our 
field, we also have a good amount of empirical expertise.  Indeed, substantial empirical research 
is taking place in all types of international economic law.  International trade law continues to be 
                                                           
5 See http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/jielaw/about.html.  
6 Michael J. Madison, The Idea of the Law Review: Scholarship, Prestige and Open Access, 10 Lewis & Clark L. 
Rev. ﾠ901, ﾠ909 ﾠ(2006) ﾠ(“([A]side ﾠfrom ﾠa ﾠfew ﾠquirky ﾠjournals) ﾠthere ﾠis ﾠno ﾠpeer ﾠreview ﾠ[of ﾠlegal ﾠscholarship].”). ﾠ ﾠ 
7 This figure does not include the editorial advisory board members.  See 
http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/jielaw/editorial_board.html.  
8 This number was arrived at by canvassing the resumes of the editorial board members.  Similarly, the growing 
Indian Journal of International Economic Law is also peer-reviewed, and 7 members of its 8-person Board of 
Editors have such degrees.  See http://www.ijiel.com/boed.html.   
9 This number was arrived at by canvassing the resumes of the conference participants, including panel members 
and other speakers. 
10 Again, the authors canvassed the resumes of the participants at that meeting, drawn from the schedule of 
proceedings, available at www.asil.org/pdfs/ielgconf0606.pdf.   5 
the main locus of empirical work,
11 but great strides continue to be made to augment doctrinal 
legal analysis with empirical research in the areas of development,
12 international finance and 
investment,
13 and international arbitration.
14  Not only is the use of empirical methodology 
becoming more prevalent in international economic law, but the trend itself is becoming 
increasingly self-conscious (this paper being but one such example).
15   
III.  What Can Empirical Research Really Tell Us? 
What do we make of this trend?  And what are we likely to learn as a result?  Indeed, can 
we ﾠreally ﾠtrust ﾠempirical ﾠresearchers ﾠto ﾠ“get ﾠthe ﾠworld ﾠright”? ﾠ ﾠAdmittedly, ﾠempirical ﾠsocial ﾠ
scientists hardly have a stellar record of predicting outcomes.  In 1972, the Club of Rome 
published its Malthusian treatise The Limits to Growth, predicting ﾠthat ﾠ“among ﾠother ﾠthings, ﾠthat ﾠ
                                                           
11 See, e.g., J.F. Colares, A Theory of WTO Adjudication: From Empirical Analysis to Bias Rules Development, 42 
Vand. J. Transnational L. 383 (conducting empirical assessment of complainant win-rates at the WTO to 
demonstrate that the interpretation of WTO agreements via dispute settlement has fostered a normative free trade 
vision, indicating biased rule development and some judicial lawmaking); Marc L. Busch & Krzysztof J. Pelc, Does 
the WTO Need a Permanent Body of Panelists?, ﾠ12 ﾠJ. ﾠInt’l ﾠEcon. ﾠL. ﾠ579 ﾠ(2009) ﾠ(using ﾠstatistical ﾠanalysis ﾠto ﾠ
determine, inter alia, that that rather than constituting a permanent body of panelists, the WTO would be better 
served by establishing a pool of permanent chairs); Meredith K. Lewis, The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute 
Settlement, ﾠ9 ﾠJ. ﾠInt’l ﾠEcon ﾠL. ﾠ895 ﾠ(2006) ﾠ(demonstrating ﾠwith ﾠempirical ﾠdata ﾠthat ﾠWTO ﾠdissents ﾠcan ﾠand ﾠdo ﾠmake ﾠa ﾠ
difference in WTO jurisprudence).   
12 See, e.g., Michael Trebilcock & Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and Development: The Contingent Case for 
Formalization, ﾠ30 ﾠU. ﾠPa. ﾠJ. ﾠInt’l ﾠLaw ﾠ397 ﾠ(2008) ﾠ(surveying ﾠempirical ﾠliterature ﾠto ﾠargue ﾠfor ﾠa ﾠreconception ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ
link between property rights and development); Lee G. Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Local 
Innovation?, ﾠ7 ﾠJ. ﾠInt’l ﾠEcon. ﾠL. ﾠ359, ﾠ359 ﾠ(2004) ﾠ(demonstrating ﾠthat ﾠ“benefits ﾠof ﾠstronger ﾠIPRs ﾠ– to the extent that 
they exist at all – are more likely to come instead from an acceleration in the domestic deployment of advanced 
technology by ﾠthe ﾠaffiliates ﾠof ﾠforeign ﾠfirms”). 
13 Gary Hufbauer & Daniel Danxia Xie, Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: The Need for International 
Surveillance, 13 ﾠJ. ﾠInt'l ﾠEcon. ﾠL. ﾠ939, ﾠ939 ﾠ(2010) ﾠ(concluding ﾠthat ﾠ“[e]mpirical evidence for the USA, other [OECD] 
countries, and a few emerging countries lends strong support for the connection between exceptionally fast growth 
of ﾠde ﾠfacto ﾠmoney ﾠand ﾠsubsequent ﾠfinancial ﾠinstability”);; ﾠPanagiotis ﾠDelimatsis ﾠ& ﾠPierre ﾠSauvé, ﾠ13 ﾠJ. ﾠInt’l ﾠEcon. ﾠL ﾠ
837, 843-47 (suggesting empirical means to gauge the fallout form the financial crisis; J. Yackee & J. Webb, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote 
Foreign Direct Investment?, ﾠ42 ﾠL ﾠ& ﾠSoc’y ﾠRev. ﾠ805 ﾠ(2008) ﾠ(finding that stronger BITs that provide access to 
arbitration are not associated with increased investment);. 
14 See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 North 
Carolina Law Review 1 (2007). 
15 For a number of articles discussing the role of empirical research in international economic law, see International 
Economic Law: The State and Future of the Discipline (Colin B. Picker, Isabella D. Bunn & Douglas W. Arner eds., 
2008).  This book collects essays from a prior conference convened by the ASIL International Economic Law 
Interest Group.     6 
the world would run out of oil by ﾠ1992.”
16  Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, a familiar 
refrain was heard from historians, economists and economic advisers about the rise of Japan, the 
absolute and relative decline in the competitiveness of the U.S., and the need to adopt activist 
industrial policy or forever stand in the shadow of the Rising Sun.
17  In 1990, Professor 
Mearsheimer forecast the imminent decline of NATO
18 (which since his prediction has grown 
from 16 members to 28) as well as the weakening of the EU
19 (which has more than doubled in 
size, ﾠfrom ﾠ12 ﾠto ﾠ27 ﾠmembers, ﾠsince ﾠhis ﾠprediction). ﾠ ﾠAs ﾠfor ﾠFrancis ﾠFukuyama’s ﾠ“end ﾠof ﾠhistory”, ﾠ
since 9/11 it has been postponed indefinitely.
20  And ﾠsadly, ﾠKeynes’ ﾠvision ﾠof ﾠa ﾠleisure ﾠsociety ﾠ– 
“three ﾠhour ﾠdays ﾠor ﾠa ﾠfifteen ﾠhour ﾠweek” ﾠ– seems increasingly fantastical.
21  Even in France.   
When it comes to predicting outcomes, it seems the less we empiricists know the better 
we ﾠdo. ﾠ ﾠ ﾠTake, ﾠfor ﾠexample, ﾠthe ﾠSupreme ﾠCourt ﾠForecasting ﾠProject, ﾠ“a ﾠfriendly ﾠinterdisciplinary ﾠ
competition to compare the accuracy of the different ways in which legal experts and political 
scientists ﾠassess ﾠand ﾠpredict ﾠSupreme ﾠCourt ﾠdecision ﾠmaking.”
22  We cannot attest to exactly how 
friendly it turned out to be, but the idea was quite intriguing: who would make the better 
prediction of ﾠhow ﾠthe ﾠCourt ﾠwould ﾠdecide ﾠthe ﾠnext ﾠTerm’s ﾠcases, ﾠstatistical ﾠforecasters ﾠor ﾠ
constitutional law experts?  The rules of this friendly competition were as follows.  The legal 
experts could read anything, including past court decisions and even the ﾠparties’ ﾠbriefs. ﾠ ﾠThey 
                                                           
16 The Economist, Treading Lightly: Does Mankind Need More that One Planet?, Sept. 19, 2002, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/1337251. 
17 See generally Paul R. Krugman, Pop Internationalism (1994). 
18 John J. Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War, ﾠ15 ﾠInt’l ﾠSec’y ﾠ52 ﾠ(Summer ﾠ
1990). 
19 John J. Mearsheimer, Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II, ﾠ15 ﾠInter’l ﾠSec’y ﾠ(Fall ﾠ1990). 
20 See Francis Fukuyama, Afterword: ﾠAfter ﾠthe ﾠ‘End ﾠof ﾠHistory’, in The End of History and the Last Man (2d ed. 
2006), available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-fukuyama/revisited_3496.jsp.  
21 A.J. Veal, The Elusive Leisure Society, School of Leisure, Sport and Tourism Working Paper 9, Sydney: 
University of Technology, Sydney (4th ed. 2009), at 17-18 ﾠ(quoting ﾠKeynes’ ﾠ1931 ﾠessay ﾠEconomic Possibilities for 
Our Grandchildren), available at www.leisure source.net. 
22   See Supreme Court Forecasting Project, Washington University School of Law, http://wusct.wustl.edu/.   7 
could also consider extra-legal factors if they so desired, such ﾠas ﾠthe ﾠjustices’ ﾠpolicy ﾠpreferences ﾠ
and ideologies.
23  The statistical model, on the other hand, was parsimonious – it took into 
account only a few bits of information, such as the ideology of the circuit court from which the 
case was referred, the type of petitioner and respondent, the type of issue and whether 
constitutionality was at stake.
24  Using these variables, the model coded every case decided by 
the Supreme Court for the past eight Terms prior to 2002 – some 628 cases.
25  The results:  the 
model predicted 75% of the 68 cases during the 2002 Term correctly.  The legal scholars – with 
their far more detailed knowledge – made correct predictions 59% of the time.
26   Of particular 
relevance to our present topic, the statistical model hugely outperformed legal experts regarding 
economic issues before the Supreme Court: it correctly predicted how the Court would rule about 
85% of the time.
27  The legal scholars might have done better with a coin flip: they were right 
just less than half the time.
28  
Prediction, of course, is not understanding.  We can predict that the sun will rise 
tomorrow morning, but we have not even the most basic understanding of the laws of 
astrophysics.  In the Supreme Court example, the empirical social scientists involved could not 
have cared less about understanding the contents of the law; they were concerned only with 
predicting the outcomes of discrete cases.  Not all empirical social scientists, however, are so 
easily satisfied.  Like lawyers and legal scholars, they too want to understand the law (they just 
                                                           
23   Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, Theodore W. Ruger, & Pauline T. Kim, Competing Approaches to 
Predicting Supreme Court Decision Making, 2 Perspectives on Politics 761, 761 (2004). 
24   The statistical ﾠmodel ﾠtook ﾠinto ﾠaccount: ﾠ“(1) the circuit of origin for the case;6 (2) the issue area of the case, 
coded ﾠfrom ﾠthe ﾠpetitioner’s ﾠbrief ﾠusing ﾠSpaeth’s ﾠprotocol;; ﾠ(3) ﾠthe ﾠtype ﾠof ﾠpetitioner ﾠ(e.g., ﾠthe ﾠUnited ﾠStates, ﾠan ﾠ
injured person, an employer); (4) the type of respondent; (5) the ideological direction of the lower court ruling, also 
coded ﾠfrom ﾠthe ﾠpetitioner’s ﾠbrief ﾠusing ﾠSpaeth’s ﾠprotocol;; ﾠand ﾠ(6) ﾠwhether ﾠor ﾠnot ﾠthe ﾠpetitioner ﾠargued ﾠthe ﾠ
constitutionality ﾠof ﾠa ﾠlaw ﾠor ﾠpractice.” ﾠ ﾠId. at 762. 
25 Id. 
26  Id. at 763. 
27 Id. at 765 fig. 3. 
28  Id.    8 
don’t ﾠwant ﾠto ﾠhave ﾠto ﾠread ﾠit!). ﾠ ﾠ ﾠTo ﾠdo ﾠso, ﾠempirical ﾠresearchers ﾠhave ﾠdeveloped ﾠincreasingly ﾠ
sophisticated methods that allow us to analyze broad patterns in complex legal texts, and to 
determine how varied actors understand and react to the existence of and changes in particular 
legal rules and institutions.   
One ﾠpowerful ﾠnew ﾠtool ﾠallows ﾠresearchers ﾠto ﾠbuild ﾠcomputer ﾠmodels ﾠthat ﾠ“search ﾠout” ﾠnot ﾠ
only key words in texts, but that also look for word clusters that take into account word-order 
meaning.  This sort of methodology can be a particularly useful tool to understand very broad 
patterns in a very large number of comparable documents.  Professor Arthur Spirling, for 
example, applies this methodology to a central issue in U.S. history: the 600 or so treaties 
negotiated between the federal government and various Native American tribes.
29  What 
distinguishes these treaties over time, he finds, is one major linguistic distinction: the harshness 
of the terms.
30  Moreover, harsh language is especially prevalent for specific tribes and especially 
just after they have suffered military defeat: without having to read 600 treaties, then, Spirling 
finds ﾠconfirmation ﾠthat ﾠas ﾠthe ﾠNative ﾠAmericans’ ﾠbargaining ﾠposition ﾠdeteriorated, ﾠso ﾠtoo ﾠdid ﾠ
their legal rights vis-à-vis the United States.
31   
One more trend in empirical legal research is also worth mentioning, and it involves a 
move to the micro-level.  Increasingly, empirical researchers are interested in how law matters to 
the way people behave.  The problem is that real world behavior is subject to scores of influences 
we social scientists cannot control.  To ameliorate this problem, social scientists increasingly are 
turning to surveys to find out how people think about international law.
32 
                                                           
29 See Arthur Spriling, Bargaining Power in Practice: US Treaty-Making with American Indians, 1784-1911, 
Working Paper, Harvard University, 2010, available at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~spirling/papers.html.  
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 The work of Michael Tomz, who conducts empirical research in this way and also designs software to allow other 
researchers to conduct such research, is particularly important in this regard.  See, e.g., Michael Tomz, The   9 
As part of the Minnesota conference, we administered just such a survey, which was 
distributed as participants registered.  It asked participants to give their subjective assessment 
about whether one hypothetical country was a relative risky place to invest, and whether another 
hypothetical country should be considered a good trade partner.  Not everyone received the exact 
same information, however: only half of respondents were given the italicized and bracketed 
information in the questions set forth below.  The variation in survey results produced by this 
small variation in information proved astounding.   
Question #1:  We first asked participants to assess the information provided and answer 
the following question: How risky would you say it is for a manufacturing company in 2010 to 
invest in a country with the following characteristics? 
  Has a history of capital controls, but has not interfered with the repatriation of profits 
within the past year, 
  Has not had a fair, competitive national election in the past decade, 
  [Has a bilateral investment treaty with an arbitration clause with your home country], 
  90% of urban areas have access to electricity 23.4 hours per day over the past year, 
  Scores ﾠwell ﾠ(above ﾠthe ﾠglobal ﾠaverage) ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠWorld ﾠBank’s ﾠ“rule ﾠof ﾠlaw” ﾠscale, 
  Has had moderate growth (4-7%) over the past decade. 
Responses (participants were asked to please check one): 
_____Risk is likely to be very low 
_____Risk is likely to be moderately low 
_____Risk is likely to be moderately high 
_____Risk is likely to be very high 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Foundation of Domestic Audience Costs: Attitudes, Expectations, and Institutions, Stanford University, 2009, 
available at http://www.stanford.edu/~tomz/pubs/Tomz-AudCost-Foundations-2009-04-14b.pdf; 
http://politicalscience.stanford.edu/faculty/tomz.html (for statistical software information).     10 
 
Results.  Even at a conference of international economic lawyers and legal scholars, the 
existence or non-existence of a bilateral investment treaty ﾠ(“BIT”) ﾠwas ﾠseen ﾠas ﾠvery ﾠsignificant ﾠto ﾠ
the riskiness of investment.  Comparing the results of the surveys, we observed the following:  
Did not get the BIT information:    Did get the BIT information: 
   
Just ﾠby ﾠexposing ﾠrespondents ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠhypothetical ﾠ“fact” ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠcountry ﾠhad ﾠa ﾠbilateral ﾠ
investment ﾠtreaty ﾠwith ﾠthe ﾠparicipant’s ﾠhome ﾠcountry, ﾠthe ﾠproportion ﾠof ﾠresponses ﾠthat ﾠ
categorized the risk as moderately to very high dropped from 31% to 21%.  No one exposed to 
the BIT information thought the country posed ﾠa ﾠ“very ﾠhigh” ﾠrisk ﾠfor ﾠinvestors. ﾠ ﾠThe ﾠsample ﾠsize ﾠ
is admittedly small, but it is interesting that we could see a ten-percentage-point shift from a 
high-risk to a low-risk category with political, policy, economic and other legal conditions held 
constant, simply by changing the information about the existence of BIT.   Thus, a not 
insignificant number of conference attendees believed that the existence of such a commitment 
may matter to the relative risk of an investment.   
Question #2:  We also asked each conference participant to answer the following 
question, this time in the area of international trade: 
very low 
risk, 4, 25% 
moderately 
low risk, 7, 
44% 
moderately 
high risk, 4, 
25% 
very high 
risk, 1, 6% 
very low risk, 
3, 16% 
moderately 
low risk, 12, 
63% 
moderately 
high risk, 4, 
21% 
very high 
risk, 0, 0%   11 
How desirable would you say a country with the following characteristics would be as a 
potential partner in a new bilateral preferential trade agreement? ﾠThe ﾠcountry… 
  Is a moderately-sized ﾠcountry ﾠclassified ﾠas ﾠ“upper-middle ﾠincome” ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠWorld ﾠBank, 
  Is known currently to protect agriculture through moderately high tariffs and modest 
export subsidies, 
  Is a member of the WTO, 
  [Last year failed to comply with a decision of an appellate panel regarding health and 
safety measures], 
  Is of no particular strategic or political importance to you or your country, 
  Has had moderate growth (4-7%) over the past decade. 
Responses (respondents were asked to please check one): 
_____Desirability as a candidate for a new preferential trade agreement is likely to be very 
low 
_____Desirability as a candidate for a new preferential trade agreement is likely to be 
moderately low 
_____Desirability as a candidate for a new preferential trade agreement is likely to be 
moderately high 
_____Desirability as a candidate for a new preferential trade agreement is likely to be very 
high. 
 
Results.  Once again, there was an experimental treatment embedded in the question: only 
half of participants were exposed to the information that the country had failed to comply with an 
appellate decision of the WTO in the past year.  Evidently this is unforgivable, at least in the 
short term, to international economic law experts, for this information alone had a profound   12 
impact ﾠon ﾠparticipants’ ﾠresponses, ﾠas ﾠwe ﾠcan ﾠsee ﾠby ﾠcomparing ﾠthe ﾠanswers ﾠof ﾠthose ﾠwho ﾠ
received the non-compliance information with the responses of those who did not: 
 
Did not get the non-compliance information:   Did get the non-compliance information: 
             
 
Maybe this is the result of experimenting on a conference of international lawyers, but 
this time the results are extreme.  Sixty-three percent of participants thought the country would 
make a very or somewhat desirable partner for a preferential trade agreement based on economic 
and political conditions, when unaware of its recent non-compliance with an appellate decision 
of the WTO.  Evidently, this information is crucial, because when it is revealed, a meager 17% 
of participants ﾠthought ﾠthis ﾠcountry ﾠwould ﾠmake ﾠa ﾠ“somewhat ﾠdesirable” ﾠtrading ﾠpartner, ﾠand ﾠ
none thought ﾠthat ﾠthis ﾠcountry ﾠshould ﾠbe ﾠconsidered ﾠ“very ﾠdesirable.” ﾠ ﾠThe ﾠsample ﾠgroup ﾠ– 
attendants at an ASIL IEL conference – quite clearly view non-compliance with the WTO 
appellate body as a very serious matter indeed.  And if this is how this group reacts to non-
compliance, what might this mean for decision-makers?  While we might expect the survey 
participants to weigh law violations more heavily than the average policymaker does, the results 
of our experiment do suggest that a reputation for non-compliance could have serious 
very 
desirable, 2, 
10% 
somewhat 
desirable, 10, 
53% 
somewhat 
undesirable, 
5, 26% 
very 
undesirable, 
2, 11% 
very desirable, 
0, 0% 
somewhat 
desirable, 3, 
17% 
somewhat 
undesirable, 
14, 78% 
very 
undesirable, 
1, 5%   13 
consequences for new agreements down the road.  In other words, we have some evidence of 
why, despite its inability to enforce its decisions, the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO 
has some bite. 
Young high-tech researchers are salivating at the prospects of converting document series 
into databases or conducting surveys of elite legal actors.
33  We write neither to condemn nor 
condone this work – though we agree that these methods have interesting possibilities and great 
risks.  The risk is that, in ﾠour ﾠexcitement ﾠto ﾠ“know ﾠmore” ﾠand ﾠto ﾠ“see ﾠfurther” ﾠusing ﾠfancy ﾠnew ﾠ
techniques, we will run roughshod over genuine expertise.  Any associated downside risks will 
be minimized and upside payoffs maximized, then, only to the extent that social scientists listen 
carefully to legal scholars to hone their programs and interpret their results.  Once legal scholars 
get over being appalled, there will be critical ways in which their insights will help empirical 
researchers who perform legal or textual analysis avoid the most egregious errors and make the 
most of their work.     
IV.  The Importance of Empirics in International Economic Law   
  Forecasting, electronic textual analysis, experiments embedded in surveys – these new, 
improving research methods might seem useless to legal researchers.  But somehow we need to 
get a systematic understanding of the way our world operates.  How can we assess and reassess 
our legal theories, doctrines and make policy prescriptions without more than a perfunctory look 
at the changing world we are trying to address? Moreover, how can we possibly talk about policy 
without some idea of the conditions under which legal innovations have ﾠ“worked” ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠpast? ﾠ
David ﾠTrubek’s ﾠwords ﾠare ﾠapropos ﾠin ﾠthis ﾠcontext: ﾠ“law ﾠcannot ﾠbe ﾠdefined ﾠ[or ﾠevaluated] ﾠother ﾠ
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analyze several decades of Egyptian ﾠclerics’ ﾠFatwas, ﾠas ﾠwell ﾠas ﾠJapanese ﾠlanguage ﾠprograms ﾠto ﾠanalyze ﾠthousands ﾠof ﾠ
Japanese electoral platforms.     14 
than by the difference it makes in society, and empirical inquiry is necessary to determine what 
that ﾠis.”
34 It is preposterous to imagine we can understand how law works and how to design 
policy without empirical legal studies.  We can use assumptions to build models and theories, but 
we need facts to build the world we want. 
  Make no mistake – we are all empiricists.  Each of us carries a model in his or her mind 
about the way the world works: lifting trade barriers increases trade, increased trade increases 
global ﾠwelfare, ﾠlevel ﾠplaying ﾠfields ﾠgenerate ﾠ“fair” ﾠresults. ﾠ ﾠOr, ﾠif ﾠwe ﾠare ﾠcynics/realists, ﾠstates ﾠ
renege on their legal agreements opportunistically, hegemonic law leads to unfair distributive 
consequences, bailouts court adverse selection and moral hazard.  But, we must ask ourselves 
whether ﾠthese ﾠmodels ﾠare ﾠ“right.” ﾠ ﾠHave ﾠwe ﾠtaken ﾠthe ﾠright ﾠlessons ﾠon ﾠboard? ﾠ ﾠA ﾠvery ﾠinteresting ﾠ
book summarizing the findings of decades of psychology research, The Science of Fear, would 
suggest we do not: people consistently overestimate the likelihood of sensational outcomes, 
partly because our brains are wired to beware of unlikely but deadly risks; but also, quite frankly, 
because the media feeds the market for disastrous news.
35  As a result, we grossly overestimate 
the likelihood of falling victim to catastrophic events
36 or ﾠdeveloping ﾠbreast ﾠcancer ﾠin ﾠone’s ﾠ
40s.
37  The ﾠ“facts” ﾠmany ﾠof ﾠus ﾠcarry ﾠin ﾠour heads just do not reflect the facts on the ground.  
Thus, we cannot simply rely on our own understandings of the world – systematic empirical 
knowledge must be substituted for biased worldviews.  
This sort of cognitive bias creates acute challenges (and, indeed, opportunities) for 
researchers and scholars.   One of us has encountered some of these in writing her recent book 
about the positive impact that the ratification of multilateral human rights agreements has had via 
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35 See generally Daniel Gardner, THE SCIENCE OF FEAR (2008)  
36 Id. at 57.  
37 Id. at 157-59.   15 
domestic politics, litigation and demands on human rights outcomes.  In short, her (empirical) 
research shows that, in some cases, governments that have ratified the Convention Against 
Torture ﾠ(“CAT”) ﾠor ﾠthe ﾠInternational ﾠCovenant ﾠon ﾠCivil ﾠand ﾠPolitical ﾠRigths ﾠactually ﾠdo reduce 
torture, allow religious freedom, and provide fair trials more than comparable countries that have 
not ratified.
38  Why do we need complex quantitative and qualitative methodologies to 
demonstrate this convincingly?  Because it is somewhat hard to believe.  These findings cut 
against the biased information we are fed each day:  News ﾠheadlines ﾠscream ﾠ“torture ﾠof ﾠIraqi ﾠ
detainees ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠIraqi ﾠauthorities,” ﾠusing ﾠelectrocution, ﾠelectric ﾠdrills ﾠand ﾠeven ﾠexecution,
39 or 
reveal images of abuse by Indian officers of youth in Kashmir.
40  We never see headlines about 
CAT ﾠratifiers ﾠthat ﾠproclaim: ﾠ“Niger ﾠEschews ﾠTorture” ﾠor ﾠ“Way ﾠto ﾠGo ﾠUruguay!” ﾠ ﾠ ﾠSo ﾠwe ﾠ
conclude that it is naive to think that any of the treaties lawyers have carefully crafted over the 
last several decades could possibly be effective; we must be wasting our time.   
Biases pervade the international investment law as well.  Pick up (or, more likely, 
navigate to) a mainstream financial news source, and we read about the progress of the growing 
network of bilateral investment treaties in protecting foreign investments - to everyone's 
advantage.  Recently, the Wall Street Journal glowed with enthusiasm for a U.S.-India BIT.  
High ﾠon ﾠObama’s ﾠto-do list in India, declared one op-ed, ﾠshould ﾠbe ﾠ“seek[ing] ﾠa ﾠbroad ﾠexpansion ﾠ
of bilateral trade and investment, beginning with a long-delayed ﾠBilateral ﾠInvestment ﾠTreaty.”
41  
Another ﾠarticle ﾠput ﾠit ﾠthus: ﾠ“Now ﾠthe ﾠquestion ﾠis ﾠhow ﾠquickly ﾠcommercial ﾠcooperation ﾠcan ﾠmove ﾠ
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40 Amnesty International, Indian Authorities Must Investigate Online Video of Kashmir Detainee Abuse, September 
12, 2010, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/indian-authorities-must-investigate-online-
video-kashmir-detainee-abuse-2010-09-13. 
41 Richard L. Armitage & R. Nicholas Burns, A To-Do List for Obama in India, WSJ.com, November 4, 2010, 
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forward, and whether traditional barriers to cross-border investment can be removed. . . . To 
work ﾠtoward ﾠthat, ﾠthe ﾠcountries ﾠcan ﾠrevitalize ﾠbilateral ﾠinvestment ﾠtreaty ﾠnegotiations ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠ.”
42  
The ﾠEconomist ﾠIntelligence ﾠUnit, ﾠreporting ﾠon ﾠEcuador’s ﾠrecent ﾠdecision ﾠto ﾠ“tear ﾠup” ﾠa ﾠnumber ﾠ
of its bilateral investment treaties as ﾠviolative ﾠof ﾠits ﾠnational ﾠConstitution, ﾠstated ﾠthat ﾠ“[t]he 
government’s ﾠdecision ﾠto ﾠpull ﾠout ﾠof ﾠinvestment ﾠtreaties ﾠcomes ﾠat ﾠa ﾠtime ﾠwhen ﾠsome ﾠofficials ﾠ
have ﾠbeen ﾠseeking ﾠto ﾠimprove ﾠperceptions ﾠof ﾠEcuador’s ﾠbusiness ﾠclimate ﾠand ﾠwill ﾠdeter ﾠforeign ﾠ
investment.”
43  
Not so fast.  Systematic empirical research provides quite a different picture.  Overall, that 
research suggests that the ability of BITs to attract foreign direct investment is minimal.
44 The 
studies that find some positive effects to BIT ratification caution that they are beneficial in 
countries that already have strong property protection regimes in place.  So why the rush to 
negotiate and ratify BITs in the 1980s and 1990s?  Jose Alvarez, whom you will hear from first 
hand later in this conference, wrote a fascinating account based on his State Department 
experience during the height of the BITs-signing frenzy.  Developing countries often entered into 
them without much of a clue about what they were getting themselves into, as a legal matter.
45  
This is consistent with empirical work one of us conducted with Andrew Guzman and Zachary 
Elkins on the pattern of BIT signings over time.  Using a statistical model to analyze the 
probability that any two states would conclude a BIT agreement, we found patterns that 
suggested developing states were looking over their shoulders at what their competitors were 
doing; that is, the BIT cascade of the 1980s and 1990s was a competitive scramble by developing 
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43 Economist Intelligence Unit: Business Latin America, 9/27/10 EIU-BLATAM 17.   
44 See infra note 45. 
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countries to impress on creditor nations the security of investing in them.
46  The evidence?  
Developing countries tended to ratify BITs when those countries with the most similar product 
profile, the most similar infrastructure, and the most similar workforces – that is, their closest 
competitor nations – did so.  To this one might add a degree of economic desperation – Professor 
Simmons is presently doing some work now that reveals that developing countries were much 
more likely to ratify BITs during periods of economic downturn.  And while evidence that BITs 
actually attract significant foreign direct investment is weak at best,
47 there is little doubt about 
what they systematically do attract: international arbitration.   The more BITs a country signs, 
the more likely they are to show up on the list of cases on the ICSID website.  It is no wonder, 
then, that developing as well as developed countries are having second thoughts about BITs, 
insisting on renegotiation, declaring moratoria on new agreements, and even in some cases 
terminating existing agreements.  We have also seen a spike recently in desperate attempts at 
arbitration award annulments.
48   The ﾠempirical ﾠwork ﾠthat ﾠtries ﾠto ﾠ“take ﾠthe ﾠpulse” ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠlegal ﾠ
regime for protection of FDI suggests that the patient is not all that well. 
And yet the fanfare continues.  Even if researchers might know that, as an empirical matter, 
BITs rarely meet their stated goals, practitioners – politicians and businesses, in particular – still 
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48 See Christina Knahr, Annulment and Its Role in the Context of Conflict Awards, in The Backlash Against 
Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality 151, 151.     18 
believe otherwise.  Associations of American businesses regularly call for the U.S. to negotiate 
BITs, particularly with Brazil, Russia, India and China (where the bulk of FDI already goes).
49   
And ﾠwhen ﾠBIT ﾠtalks ﾠwith ﾠChina ﾠwere ﾠannounced ﾠin ﾠJune ﾠof ﾠ2008, ﾠfor ﾠexample, ﾠ“American ﾠ
business ﾠinterests ﾠreacted ﾠpositively” ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠnews.
50  Enthusiasm is not limited to the developed 
world – developing countries continue to negotiate BITs amongst themselves and with the North. 
In this time of crisis and change, we are inundated with sensationalized and 
unsophisticated accounts of the world.  If we are not careful, we are sure to make mistakes about 
the very phenomenon we gathered at the University of Minnesota to consider:  International 
Economic Law in a Time of Change.  It is particularly important that as we try to sort out what 
has happened and how to move forward, we do so with the strongest empirical basis we can.  
Reactionary policies grounded in sensational views of the recent crisis are the likely result of a 
failure to merge empirical research with legal reform.  
V.  Linking Empirics with Law and Policy 
  This takes us to the heart of the matter – in what ways does empirical research help 
international economic lawyers and legal scholars in their capacities as policy makers?  Two 
avenues, distinct but intimately related, immediately come to mind.      
  First and foremost, empirical studies give us the ability to systematically evaluate legal 
institutions in light of their goals.  As discussed briefly above, researchers proceeding 
empirically have confirmed that the energies and resources expended on negotiating and 
ratifying multilateral treaties about trade and human rights, for example, are not for naught – 
these legal texts do promote many of their stated goals.  One of the first systematic treatments by 
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Andrew Rose, a professor in the business school at UC Berkeley, came to what for many was a 
surprising and highly counterintuitive conclusion: he found little evidence that countries joining 
or belonging to the GATT/WTO have different trade patterns from outsiders, though the GSP 
seems to have a strong effect.
51 Empirical work of this kind is wonderfully provocative, and 
scholars ﾠgot ﾠto ﾠwork ﾠright ﾠaway ﾠto ﾠdetermine ﾠwhether ﾠRose’s ﾠfindings ﾠwere ﾠrobust. ﾠ ﾠAcross ﾠthe ﾠ
Bay from Rose, empirical political scientists Judith Goldstein, Michael Tomz and Doug Rivers 
looked ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠway ﾠ“members” ﾠwere ﾠcoded ﾠin ﾠRose’s ﾠstudy ﾠand ﾠfound ﾠthat ﾠthere ﾠwere ﾠactually ﾠlots ﾠ
of ﾠcountries ﾠwho ﾠwere ﾠnot ﾠfull ﾠmembers ﾠ(and ﾠtherefore ﾠnot ﾠcoded ﾠas ﾠsuch ﾠin ﾠRose’s ﾠdataset) ﾠbut ﾠ
that had formally been extended all the benefits of membership.
52  Once you realize these states 
do ﾠin ﾠfact ﾠ“participate” ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠregime ﾠ– and do the appropriate recoding – Goldstein and her 
collaborators found a strong and positive effect to the liberalizing rules of the GATT/WTO.
53   
But ﾠthe ﾠempiricists ﾠdidn’t ﾠstop ﾠthere – they have continued to closely examine the distributive 
consequences of international economic law.  Subramanian and Wei, to name but one study, 
found that the WTO promotes trade strongly but unevenly.
54  If we were sure it were otherwise, 
it would be high time to determine where else to focus our attention.  It might indeed be 
otherwise in the BIT context, where there is certainly some question about whether the BIT 
regime has achieved its goals.
55 
As an obvious corollary, empirical research might give us reason to support the revision 
of our legal rules.  Consider Article 28(2) of the GATT, which allows developing countries to 
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implement infant-industry protections.
56  Empirical data has somewhat consistently shown that 
infant-industry protections do not work to spur long-term growth or development.
57  If the goals 
of the WTO are to promote trade liberalization, global welfare and development, the disconnect 
between empirics and reality might appear disconcerting.   
Second, empirical studies give us the facts on which to base legal doctrine and public 
policy.  Probably the most famous example of this in American law is footnote 11 in Brown v. 
Board of Education, where the U.S. Supreme Court cited to social psychology studies to support 
its ﾠconclusion ﾠthat ﾠ“separate ﾠbut ﾠequal” ﾠsegregated ﾠeducational ﾠfacilities ﾠare ﾠinherently ﾠunequal.
58  
Certainly ﾠdoing ﾠso ﾠwas ﾠnot ﾠnecessary ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠCourt’s ﾠanalysis ﾠ– it could have relied on the moral 
and doctrinal judgment that discrimination per se is injurious – but the persuasive power of such 
research is at times undeniable.   
In the area of international trade, it is becoming clear that legal structures and processes 
are having important impacts on outcomes – and we should take these lessons on board when 
thinking about how these agreements might be modified in the future.  An important body of 
empirical work by a number of international trade scholars – beginning in earnest with Robert 
Hudec – determined that developing countries, particularly LDCs, initiated GATT/WTO disputes 
significantly ﾠless ﾠfrequently ﾠthan ﾠthey ﾠ“should,” ﾠand ﾠeven ﾠthen ﾠgarnered ﾠonly ﾠmixed ﾠresults ﾠin ﾠ
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trade litigation.
59   Especially ﾠtroubling ﾠwas ﾠMarc ﾠBusch’s ﾠrevelation ﾠthat ﾠLDCs ﾠwere ﾠone-third 
less likely to file complaints against developed states under the WTO than they were under the 
post-1989 GATT regime.
60  This ﾠresearch ﾠalso ﾠpointed ﾠto ﾠreasons ﾠfor ﾠthis ﾠtrend: ﾠthe ﾠWTO’s ﾠ
increased legal and procedural complexity created increased costs and required increased legal 
capacity.
61  Most striking are not these conclusions, which developing countries and their 
advocates already knew well,
62 but their results – these findings gave credence to calls from 
developing ﾠcountries ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠestablishment ﾠof ﾠan ﾠAdvisory ﾠCentre ﾠon ﾠWTO ﾠLaw ﾠ(the ﾠ“Advisory ﾠ
Centre”), ﾠwhich ﾠwas ﾠfinally formed in 2001.
63  The ﾠAdvisory ﾠCentre’s ﾠ“mission ﾠis ﾠto ﾠprovide ﾠ
developing countries and LDCs with the legal capacity necessary to enable them to take full 
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advantage ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠbenefits ﾠand ﾠopportunities ﾠoffered ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠWTO.”
64  After the better part of a 
decade, the Advisory Centre has assisted developing countries initiate some 19 complaints – the 
same number of complaints that the U.S. itself initiated in the same time period.
65 
Consider ﾠas ﾠwell ﾠthe ﾠrise ﾠand ﾠfall ﾠof ﾠStrategic ﾠTrade ﾠPolicy ﾠ(“STP”). ﾠ ﾠIn ﾠthe ﾠ1980s, a 
group of economists – Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman among them – developed a powerful 
theoretical critique of comparative advantage in high-technology industries characterized by 
increasing returns to scale.  Always provocative, Krugman at first questioned whether free trade 
had become passé,
66 but when he saw his theories being co-opted by protectionist policy-makers 
he was relentless in demanding thorough empirical research before making this theory 
operational.
67  In the U.S. at least, the push for STP has diminished, and seemingly for the best: 
aside from the complex political economy problems posed by STP, empirical research on each 
major attempt at STP, even of the Japanese semiconductor industry, has shown that the policy 
imposed net costs each time.
68  The STP saga demonstrates the limits of theoretical models (and 
reactionary policy-making) and the importance of empirical study to effectively translate theory 
into policy and practice. 
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Recent BITs research is also instructive.  Notwithstanding the problems with BITs, 
researchers Tobin and Busch recently analyzed annual data on pairs of developing and developed 
countries between 1960 and 2004, concluding that BITs raise the prospects of getting a North-
South preferential trade agreement, at least up to a point.
69  Thus, we might encourage 
negotiation of BITs as an indirect way to increase trade and investment flows.  Viewed in this 
light ﾠthe ﾠrecent ﾠcommentary ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠoccasion ﾠof ﾠObama’s ﾠtrip ﾠto ﾠIndia ﾠmay ﾠnot ﾠseem ﾠso ﾠflawed.
70 
Empiricism, of course, is just one tool in the woodshed. Legal institutions are political 
compromises between competing goals, not real-world manifestations of state-of-the-art 
statistical analysis.  Although empirical methodologies are important in discovering how our 
legal institutions operate and how they impact our world, we cannot begin truly to understand 
them simply by running regressions.  In translating empirics into policy, the role of the lawyer, 
the political economist, and the politician are paramount, given their intimate knowledge of the 
institutional and normative constraints that operate on the ground.  Thus, even if some empirical 
studies demonstrate the weakness of the theories underlying particular international economic 
laws, we might not actually expend resources on their revision for a number of reasons – in the 
infant-industry context, for example, because of what Article 28(b) represents to developing 
countries: the recognition of their historical experience and the importance of policy space as a 
general principle.
71 Thus, when we are evaluating our world and the legal institutions that create 
it, empirical studies are undeniably important, but they can never tell the whole story. 
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VI.  Conclusions: 
The ASIL IELG brought us together to understand and influence a time of change in 
international economic law.  This is no easy task, and will require in-depth study by researchers 
from a broad range of disciplines.  It is our firm belief that an important – indeed, an 
indispensable – tool of international economic law going forward will be systematic empirical 
research.  Given its unique nexus with economics, political economy, international relations, and 
domestic and international law, the empirical turn in international economic law is no 
coincidence, and should be embraced.  We do not mean to argue that it is essential for legal 
scholars to run out and get a Ph.D. in statistics or economics or social science.  In most cases that 
would ﾠbe ﾠan ﾠutter ﾠwaste ﾠof ﾠa ﾠlawyer’s ﾠtime ﾠand ﾠtraining. ﾠ ﾠOne ﾠdoes ﾠnot ﾠneed ﾠa ﾠPh.D. ﾠin ﾠsocial 
sciences to make appropriate use of empirical research – one only needs a friend or colleague 
with ﾠempirical ﾠtraining. ﾠ ﾠInterdisciplinary ﾠcollaboration ﾠunlocks ﾠsynergies;; ﾠthis ﾠis ﾠthe ﾠuniversity’s ﾠ
version of comparative advantage.  
Notwithstanding increases in the amount of empirical international economic law research 
and advances in the quality of empirical methodologies, however, controversy remains as to 
whether the empirical trend is a good thing for the study of international economic law.  On the 
one ﾠhand, ﾠthere ﾠare ﾠthose ﾠwho ﾠpush ﾠback ﾠon ﾠempiricism’s ﾠown ﾠterms. ﾠ ﾠWhat ﾠdoes ﾠthis ﾠempirical ﾠ
data actually tell us? Why is it important?  Are the conclusions robust, and why do social 
scientists turn up so many inconsistent answers?  Anyone should be asking these questions of 
empirical research – this is not a special sore spot felt by the legal academy alone.   
But we sense the anxieties among some legal scholars run deeper.  Some are concerned 
that empirical research is not and certainly should not be what the legal academy is all about.  
Social science and legal scholarship are distinct enterprises with inherently different purposes, it   25 
is easy to believe, and each discipline is taught to put its intellectual firepower to different 
use.  Science is always a hypothesis from which we can advance in the face of better evidence or 
more convincing theory.  The key is absolute transparency in data methods – publicness and 
replicability are primary values.  As Keynes famously wrote in his 1933 Essays in Biography, 
“There is no harm in being sometimes wrong — especially ﾠif ﾠone ﾠis ﾠpromptly ﾠfound ﾠout.” ﾠ ﾠ
(Which to our occasional embarrassment, we all can potentially be!)  More important than the 
‘stance’ ﾠa ﾠresearcher ﾠtakes ﾠtoday ﾠis ﾠher ﾠcommitment ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠscientific ﾠprocess, to the treatment of 
data as public goods.  Social scientists can critique, bicker, and collaborate, but we don't have to 
settle anything by the end of the day.  The normal science model is all about edging toward the 
truth in the long run, and generally doing so in a cooperative, as opposed to adversarial, way. 
Legal scholars are trained to use their intellectual skills differently: to make the best case 
to win the point.  At the end of the day, a decision must be taken in a case or a policy must be 
chosen and implemented.  The need to decide pushes legal scholars into their respective 
positions.  The pressure of a decision also makes legal scholars less tolerant of ambiguity and 
uncertainty, both of which are rife in the "scientific" enterprise.  Social scientists draw 
conclusions with varying degrees of certainty, measured by confidence intervals, but advocates 
cannot be wafflers.  Lee Epstein and Gary King aptly described the nature of the problem thus: 
“An ﾠattorney ﾠwho ﾠtreats ﾠa ﾠclient ﾠlike ﾠa ﾠhypothesis would be disbarred; a Ph.D. who advocates a 
hypothesis ﾠlike ﾠa ﾠclient ﾠwould ﾠbe ﾠignored.”
72   
This viewpoint overstates the gulf between social scientists and lawyers to some extent.  
As our opening tale about Holmes and Watson suggests, and as we have intended to convey 
throughout this article, there undoubtedly are important synergies that can be achieved via 
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partnerships between legal scholars and empirical researchers.  Of particular benefit to lawyers, 
the factual groundwork to evaluate legal institutions and formulate policy prescriptions will be 
better laid.  For empirical researchers, the benefits are immense as well: lawyers and legal 
scholars can focus us on questions that actually need answering, can help us understand why 
things are the way they are and what possibilities there are for the future, and are the conduits by 
which data and doctrine are translated into policy.  At the most fundamental level, moreover, 
empirical researchers and lawyers are engaged in the same impossible task: a search for the truth.  
By working together, international economic lawyers and empirical researchers can focus on the 
most important variables and the most important questions – while ﾠusing ﾠlegal ﾠscholars’ ﾠ
doctrinal, philosophical, and public policy knowledge to confirm and explain empirical findings 
– thereby improving the process by which data is accumulated and distributed.  This, in turn, will 
increase the value of empirical research to international economic lawyers.  There is hope yet 
that we can see eye to eye, and in doing so, improve our vision. 
We hope that our readers – lawyers and legal scholars in particular – will consider the 
extent to which their work depends upon empirical claims about our world.  We find ourselves in 
a period of crisis and change – consider too whether we are relying on sensationalized 
worldviews in formulating our beliefs and policies.  And consider, finally, the comparative 
advantages you possess in analyzing your world.  The possibilities for collaboration are many, 
and we should all think about whether it would enrich our scholarship to work together to an 
even greater degree than we already have. 